Trust

Security & trust model

What's enforced by Solana, what's proven by receipts, what you still have to trust, and how the system behaves when things go wrong.

Enforced on chain

These hold regardless of what the assistant, the runtime or any server does, because neuron_allowance checks them in every transaction:

What receipts prove, and what they don't

A receipt proves what the runtime reported happened, and that the record hasn't changed since it was posted: the hash chain makes a dropped or edited batch detectable, and Merkle proofs show a receipt was in a posted batch. It does not yet prove a model really produced a given output. That's the job of the verification layer (staked operators, re-execution and slashing), which is planned.

What's public

Solana accounts and transactions are public. Anyone who knows (or finds) an allowance's address can read the following, today:

DataWho can see it
The allowance: owner, session key, budget, ask-first threshold, amount spent this period, payee list, paused or notEveryone
Each payment: amount, payee, time, and the receipt fingerprint it carriesEveryone
Receipt batches: a Merkle root, a count, a time range and the file hashEveryone, but they reveal nothing about what was said or done
Prompts, outputs, tool arguments and resultsOnly you, and anyone you give a receipt's salt to

So conversations are private, but spending isn't: a payment shows who was paid, how much and when. Rollup blocks are public in the same way.

Private payments (planned)

The plugin pays through a payment rail (paymentRail, default "allowance"), so a private rail can replace the public USDC transfer without changing the rules, the journal or the receipts. The candidate is Solana Privacy Rings, which went live on mainnet in November 2026. A devnet test showed:

That's a significant build with its own audit, planned after the core is live on devnet.

Rollup trust today

When things go wrong

SituationBehaviour
Solana unreachable while payingThe paid tool doesn't run; the assistant is told nothing was charged
Payment sent, confirmation unclearNot treated as failed: "don't retry"; if it lands it becomes a credit for the retry
Process dies mid-paymentThe payment was journaled before sending and is reconciled at the next start
Allowance unreadable for 5 minutesEvery tool is blocked, since Pause can't be confirmed
Receipts can't be postedRetried with backoff; never re-posted once landed; saved to disk rather than dropped
A block-production crash on the rollupThe node exits, and health reports unhealthy, rather than running broken

Keys and private RPC

Reviews

The programs, the plugin and SDK, and the rollup each had an independent security review. Every critical, high and medium finding was fixed with a regression test, including duplicate-account supply inflation and a one-transaction halt in the rollup, front-running of rollup initialization, and approval-time payee substitution in the allowance. Remaining known limits: rollup account scans are a full pass (no owner index yet), block headers are kept in memory, timestamps rely on the sequencer's clock, and Token-2022 mints aren't supported. None of this has had an external audit; that comes before mainnet.